The Dentist is NOT in

CAHILL V. ROSA and LASSER V. ROSA , 89 N.Y.2d 14, 674 N.E.2d 274, 651 N.Y.S.2d 344

Decided October 15, 1986

                  

            A man who had been exposed to AIDS and was awaiting his HIV test results cracked a tooth and went to Dr. Cahill's dental office without an appointment for treatment.  He was told that the doctor would see him immediately but after learning that the man may be HIV positive the dentist declined to treat him.  Another dentist, Dr. Lasser of Newburgh, refused to continue treatment of a patient once the patient became HIV positive. 

 

            In separate actions both patients filed discrimination complaints against the dentists under New York State's Human Rights Law (HRL).  The HRL provides that it shall be "an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accomodation, resort or amusement, because of the...disability... of any person...to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof."  The patients' claim was that they were denied access to the dentist because of their disability or perceived disability. 

 

            The Human Rights Commission found in favor of the patients but when the dentists appealed the decisions,  the Appellate Division reversed and found for the dentists.  The question for the New York State Court of Appeals was whether a private dental office is a "public accommodation" within the meaning of the HRL.  It was a case where the judiciary must determine the legislature's intent where such intent is not clear from the language of the law. 

 

            In a 4-3 decision, the New York State Court of Appeals narrowly decided that these dentists offices were places of "public accommodation" and ruled against the dentists.  The HRL states that "[t]he term 'place of public accommodation, resort or amusement' shall include, except as hereinafter specified, all places within the meaning of such term" and then goes on to provide examples of "public accommodations."  Dentists offices were not on the list of examples nor were they on the list of exceptions. 

 

            Nevertheless, the Court said that because the purpose of the statute was to ensure that New Yorkers have "an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life" the legislature intended to include health care providers within the HRL coverage.  In addition, dentists' offices are covered by the HRL as places of "public accommodation" because they provide services to the public.  They are generally open to all comers and are found by patients through advertisement, telephone book listings, referrals or as in the case of Dr. Cahill's patient, by office signage. 

 

            The Court additionally observed that finding an exemption for private dental offices would mean that the legislature intended to protect people with disabilities from discrimination in ice cream parlors or skating rinks, but that dental and presumably other medical providers could lawfully deny health care to them solely on the basis of their disability.  An unlikely formulation.

 

            The dissenting judges believed that the term "public accommodation" was intended by the legislature to be used more narrowly.  It was not intended to cover all business establishments of any kind, as some other states' statutes do. It was intended to cover only public accommodations which are generally understood to be facilities of "a quasi-public character" like places of public lodging and all places serving food and drink to the public, health care dispensaries, clinics and hospitals, and places providing public entertainment.  While privately owned, these are places which are held open to the general public, to which the public is invited to patronize.  They are devoted to the general benefit of the citizenry. In the view of the dissent, privately practicing dentists don't fit into this category.

 



 

Learning Activities

                                                                                                                                   

Terms to Know

 

·                     legislative intent

·                     public accommodation

 

 

Compare and Contrast

 

Both Cahill and Heart of Altlanta Motel v. United States (379 U.S. 241 (1964)) involved situations in which private businesses wished to be exempt from laws that require them to treat all people equally.  Both the dentists and the Motel owners wished to have the laws be defined narrowly so as to exclude their conduct.  In Cahill, the dentists wanted the HRL to be interpreted to exclude their offices as places of public accommodation under New York State law.  In Heart of Atlanta, the motel owner claimed that since their motel was "of a purely local character" it should not be subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause and so the Civil Rights Act if 1964 was unconstitutional when applied to their racially segregated motel.  In Cahill, the New York Court of Appeals decided that the dental offices were places of public accommodation in which dentists may not discriminate.  In Heart of Atlanta, the court upheld the Civil Rights Act as a proper exercise of federal legislative authority under the Commerce Clause because "the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof...which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce." 

 

If the Cahill court would have decided differently and left the dentists free to discriminate what could the New York State legislature have done in response if they disagreed with the court?  What about if the Heart of Atlanta court had decided differently finding that the Congress went beyond its powers under the Commerce Clause and left the motel free to discriminate?  What could the Congress have done in response, for they surely would have disagreed with the Court?

 

 

Critical Thinking

 

What if Dr. Cahill and Dr. Lasser's offices were very exclusive and didn't have a yellow pages listing, advertise, or even have signage indicating it was a dentists' office?  Should they still be considered public accommodations who cannot lawfully discriminate?  Is there any way that a doctor or other business owner should be able to take themselves out of reach of the anti-discrimination law so that they can run their businesses in the way of their choosing?